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UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
1. There can be a complete prohibition of "loud and raucous"
sound equipment on the streets. 21
2. An ordinance giving a public official the power to exercise un-
regulated censorship over the use of sound equipment may con-
stitute a violation of freedom of speech, on the basis of the Saia
case.
2 2
The ratio decidendi of Saia has been seriously undermined by
Kovacs, but the former has not been specifically overruled. While one
applauds the insistence of Justices Rutledge and Black on accurate drafts-
manship of ordinances, especially those with a penal flavor, the majority
is to be commended for returning from the metaphysical "freedoms" of
Saia to a recognition of the realities of life as it is actually lived in cities.
Sheer volume of sound is not thought; free speech does not include the
right to force others to listen; and the citizens can still protect them-
selves against notorious public nuisances by methods having no tendency




INTANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY TAX: LIMITED
REVENUE PRODUCING ABILITY
Florida Statutes, c. 199 (1941)
A state that constitutionally denies itself the right to levy income
taxes,' estate or inheritance taxes on residents in excess of the credit the
United States may allow on similar taxes,2 or state ad valorem taxes on real
"Under the authority of the Kovacs case, this is limited to equipment on the street
itself and in actual operation.
"But see Note, 2 U. or FLA. L. Rav. 103, 113 (1949).
'FLA. CoNsT. Art. IX, §11.
2FLA. CONST. Art. IX, §11, as amended 1930, following Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S.
1
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or tangible personal property, 3 may expect revenue problems. The state
of Florida has retained,4 however, and does exercise, 5 the power to levy an
intangible personal property tax; and the current demand for increased
revenue suggests a study of the operation of the laws covering this tax,
in order to determine its success as a revenue producer.
6
The statutes define 7 intangible personal property, classify s it, and pre-
scribe different rates9 for the classifications. So long as rate differences on
tangible and intangible personal property exist, questions as to whether
certain property is tangible or intangible can be expected.' 0 Classes
12 (1927). Supplementing statutes are FLA. STAT. §198.02 (1941) (resident decedents)
and FLA. STAT. §198.03 (1941) (non-resident decedents).
'FLA. CONsT. Art. IX, §2.
'The prohibitions of other taxes in FLA. CONST. Art. IX, §1, as amended in 1924
and 1944, specifically except this tax. State ex rel. Watson v. Lee, 157 Fla. 62, 24 So.2d
798 (1946), held that the tax is not affected by Sections 2 and 5, Art. IX, and that
appropriations for purposes of general and local concern do not collide with the general
rule laid down in Amos v. Mathews, 99 Fla. 1, 65, 126 So. 308, 331 (1930), that state
taxes cannot be used for an exclusively county purpose. Distribution of the revenue
is covered by FLA. STAT. §199.1 (Cum. Supp. 1947). The amendment of 1924 was
not self-executing; and until the Legislature acted to put it into practical operation on
January 1, 1932, the intangibles were treated in the same manner as other personal
property. Porter v. First Nat. Bank of Panama City, 96 Fla. 740, 119 So. 130 (1928).
5 FxA. STAT. §§199.01-199.32 (1941), as amended, FLA. STAT., c. 199 (Cum. Supp.
1947).
'Receipts for 1946-47 ran a little over $3,000,000, with cost of collection about 10%.
MAJOR STATE TAXES, INsTrUTE oF GOVERNfENT 37 (1948). The booklet contains an
excellent report on major Florida state taxes, with a critical analysis by the Department
of Public Administration, Florida State University, Tallahassee.
'FLA. STAT. §199.01 (1941): 1... all personal property which is not in itself in-
trinsically valuable but which derives its chief value from that which it represents ...
8FLA. STAT. §199.02 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
'Intangibles are specifically excepted from the requirement of uniformity and
equality by FLA. CoxsT. Art. IX, §1, but the rate is limited to two mills on the dollar
of assessed valuation. FLA. STAT. §199.11 (Cum. Supp. 1947) rates the classifications
as follows: (1) Class A, one twentieth of one mill on the dollar of the taxable value;
(2) Class B, one mill on the dollar of the taxable value; (3) Class C, three mills on
the dollar of the taxable value, which taxable value shall be the principal amount of
the indebtedness; (4) Class D, catch-all section, one mill on the dollar of the taxable
value. FLA. STAT. §199.05 (1941) provides that intangible personal property shall be
assessed at its full cash value.
1 Schleman v. Guaranty Title Co., 153 Fla. 379, 15 So.2d 754 (1943), held abstract
books tangible rather than intangible personal property.
2
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A," Bl and D13 are subject to an annual levy, while Class C 1 4 is
taxed only once. Though Class C resembles an excise tax for the privilege
of recording the instrument, the fact that it is an intangible personal prop-
erty tax, with the act of recording merely the occasion for levying the tax
on the property, has been reaffirmed. 1 5
Jurisdiction is the main problem encountered in the enforcement of this
tax, and no one principle of jurisdiction can be stated that will apply to all
intangibles.1 6 The cases run from outright ownership of intangibles by
residents,1 7 to varying proprietary interests in trusts,' 8 and include prob-
"
1 FLA. STAT. §199.02(1) (Cum. Supp. 1947): ". . . all moneys, United States legal
tender notes, bank deposits of all kinds, certificates of deposits, cashiers' and certified
checks, bills of exchange, drafts, and money placed with savings, building and loan
associations."
12
FLA. STAT. §199.02 (2) (Cum. Supp. 1947): "... all stocks, or shares of incorpor-
ated or unincorporated companies; all bonds, except bonds of the several municipalities,
counties and other taxing districts of the State of Florida, and except bonds of the
United States government and its agencies; . .. and the beneficial interest of residents
of Florida in trust estates of all kinds when the trustee resides outside the State of
Florida, or if the trustee is a corporation and has its principal place of business outside
of the State of Florida; provided, that if the trustee returns to the tax assessor such
beneficial interest and pays the tax thereon to the tax collector in Florida, then the
owner of such beneficial interests shall not be required to return the same for taxation;
provided, further, that when the trustee is a resident of Florida and returns the corpus
of the trust for taxation as provided by law there shall be no tax upon the beneficial
interest in such trust."
"
3
FLA. STAT. §199.02(4) (Cum. Supp. 1947): "... all other intangible personal
property not embraced in classes A, B or C."
14FLA. STAT. §199.02(3) (Cum. Supp. 1947): "... all notes, bonds and other obliga-
tions bearing date subsequent to December 31, 1941, for payment of money which are
secured by mortgage, deed of trust or other liens upon real property situated in
Florida; provided, that only that part of the value of the mortgage, deed of trust, or
other lien, the real property of which is located within the state shall bear to the
whole value of the real property described in said obligation shall be included."
"State ex rel. Seaboard A. L. Ry. v. Gay, 35 So.2d 403 (Fla. 1948).
"Lowndes, Bases of Jurisdiction in State Taxation of Inheritances and Property,
29 MicH. L. REv. 850, 871 (1931).
"Hunt v. Turner, 54 Fla. 654, 45 So. 509 (1907) (stating the general rule that the
personal property of a person domiciled in a given state has its situs in that state in
contemplation of law and is taxable there); Starkey v. Carson, 138 Fla. 301, 189 So.
385 (1939) (holding a resident liable for the tax on all his intangible personal property,
wherever located, no business situs of such property elsewhere being duly shown).
"8Mahan v. Lummus, 35 So.2d 725 (Fla. 1948); Burrows v. Hagerman, 159 Fla. 826,
33 So.2d 34 (1947); Owens v. Fosdick, 153 Fla. 17, 13 So.2d 700 (1943); Wood v. Ford,
148 Fla. 66, 3 So.2d 490 (1941).
3
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lems involving foreign concerns doing business in Florida' 9 as well as
debts secured by Florida realty but owed to residents of other states.
20
Although logical and practical distinctions between estate and prop-
erty taxes exist, the tendency in' other jurisdictions has been to apply the
holdings interchangeably when intangibles are involved.2 1 With jurisdic-
tion to levy a death transfer tax broadened 2 2 and federal constitutional
objections to multiple taxation removed,23 the only barrier to multiple
taxation of intangibles remains in the discretion of the states themselves.
Decisions recognizing the authority of states to levy intangible personal
property taxes on meager jurisdictional bases have suggested reciprocal
statutory tax provisions. 2 4 Florida has such a reciprocal statute on in-
"0Gay v. Bessemer Properties, Inc., 159 Fla. 729, 32 So. 2d 587 (1947); Smith v.
Lummus, 149 Fla. 660, 6 So.2d 625 (1942), 153 Fla. 415, 14 So.2d 897 (1943).
"'State ex rel. Seaboard A. L. Ry. v. Gay, 35 So.2d 403 (Fla. 1948).
"1A Pennsylvania property tax upon the equitable interest of a resident in a trust
of intangibles in New York was upheld in Stewart v. Pennsylvania, 312 U. S. 649
(1941), affirming 338 Pa. 9, 12 A.2d 444 (1940). The Pennsylvania court relied on
Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357 (1939) (reserved power of appointment over trust
property) and Graves v. Elliott, 307 U. S. 383 (1939) (reserved power of revocation),
both cases upholding the right of the settlor's domicile to include corpus of foreign
trust in his estate for tax purposes as well as the right of the state in which the trust
was located to tax the transfer.
"Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U. S. 174, 180 (1942), approving "extension of benefit" or
"exercise of the state law to effect the transfer" as sufficient to enable a state to levy
a death transfer tax on intangibles.
"Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U. S. 174 (1942).
"Greenough v. Tax Assessors of Newport, 331 U. S. 486, 490 (1947). The Supreme
Court, per Reed, J., said:
"For the purpose of taxation of those residents within her borders, Rhode Island
has sovereign power unembarrassed by any restriction except those that emerge
from the Constitution. Whether that power is exercised wisely or unwisely is the
problem of each state. It may well be that sound fiscal policy would be promoted
by a tax upon trust intangibles levied only by the state that is the seat of a testa-
mentary trust. Or, it may be that the actual domicile of the trustee should be
preferred for a single tax. Utilization by the states of modern reciprocal statutory
tax provisions may more fairly distribute tax benefits and burdens, although the
danger of competitive inducements for obtaining a settlor's favor are obvious. But
our question here is whether or not a provision of the Constitution forbids this tax.
Neither the expediency of the levy nor its economic effect on the economy of the
taxing state is for our consideration. We are dealing with the totality of a state's
authority in the exercise of its revenue raising powers."
Cf. Stone, J, dissenting, in First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 334
(1931), overruled by Utah v. Aldrich, supra note 23:
4
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tangibles for estate tax purposes2 5 but it does not extend to ordinary in-
tangible personal property taxes. Twelve states have constitutionally or
legislatively deprived themselves of the right to levy an intangible personal
property tax, and in four other states all but a few intangibles have been
exempted. 2 6 Income tax legislation reaching the income from the intan-
gibles has in most instances replaced the intangible personal property
tax.
2 7
I. JURISDICTION IN TRUST CASES
All the trust cases hereinafter discussed involve foreign trusts, and all
name Florida residents as beneficiaries, but the settlor was not in each in-
stance a Florida resident. The Florida prohibition of an income tax
2 8
comes into play when the beneficiary is limited to the mere right to income.
Trustees domiciled in Florida must report intangibles they control for
taxation,2 9 and resident beneficiaries need not report their beneficial in-
terest in intangibles reported by Florida trustees.3 0 Since the Florida
trustee is liable for the tax on intangibles he controls, 3 1 the domicile or
proprietary extent of the beneficiary's interest is immaterial. 3 2 Resident
"Even if it be assumed that some protection from multiple taxation, which the
Constitution has failed to provide, is desirable, and that this Court is free to
supply it, that result would seem more likely to be attained, without injustice to
the states, by familiar types of reciprocal state legislation, than by stretching the
due process clause to cover this case. See 28 Columbia L. Rev. 806; 43 Harvard
L. Rev. 641."
2 FLA. STAT. §198.44 (1941).
"Roesken, Trends in the Ad Valorem Taxation of Intangibles, 26 TAxxg 639 (1948).
Jurisdictions exempting in toto are Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Utah, Vermont,
Washington and Wisconsin. Only a few intangibles are reached in Louisiana, Maryland,
Minnesota and Nevada.
"'Roesken, supra note 26.
"
8FLA. CoiqsT. Art. IX, §11.
"FLA. STAT. §199.07 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
"FLA. STAT. §199.07 (Cum. Supp. 1947), read in conjunction with FLA. STAT.
§ 199.02 (2) (Cum. Supp. 1947), relieves the beneficial interest in a trust from taxation
by Florida when the trustee is a resident of Florida and returns the corpus of the
trust for taxation.
"
1FLA. STAT. §199.07 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
"2State v. Beardsley, 77 Fla. 803, 82 So. 794 (1919), stated that a trustee was the
owner of intangibles and taxable at his domicile, but the tax was refused because the
county lacked jurisdiction of either the trustee or beneficiary. A recent case sustaining
such taxation is Greenough v. Tax Assessors of Newport, 331 U. S. 486 (1947), involv-
5
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beneficiaries of foreign trusts may choose between reporting their bene-
ficial interests themselves or having the foreign trustee report the beneficial
interest for them and pay the tax to the Florida collector.3 3 The former
alternative is preferable for a resident beneficiary whose interest in the
foreign trust is limited to the mere right to income, because the court looks
to the interest of the resident beneficiary, which may run the gamut from a
mere right to receive the income34 to the verge of absolute control; 3 5 and
if his interest amounts only to a right to income, the state does not tax.
The test of whether the tax amounts to an income tax and is therefore un-
constitutional has not been limited to trust situations.
3 6
In Wood v. Ford3 7 the Florida beneficiary of a foreign trust created
by a non-resident settlor had the right to income for life, with power to
appoint the principal in his will; the trust was irrevocable, and the bene-
ficiary on becoming an adult could alienate the income. The Court
characterized this interest as one subject to the tax and held the tax pay-
able even though the trustee could be taxed at his domicile, emphasizing
the fact that the interest of the beneficiary in the trust was distinct from
the rights of the trustee. In Owens v. Fosdick38 a foreign trust created
by a non-resident settlor named a Florida resident as beneficiary, with
the right to income only and no right to assign. After comparing the
rights of the beneficiary in the Owens case with the rights of the benefici-
ary in the Wood case, the Court concluded that in the Owens case there
was nothing more than an estate in income and that to tax it would violate
the spirit and intent of the constitutional provision prohibiting an income
ing a New York trust co~mposed of intangibles, one of the two trustees residing in
Rhode Island. The Supreme Court affirmed in a five to four decision the right of the
city in which the one trustee was domiciled to levy a property tax on one half the
value of the trust. jurisdictional basis for the tax was the fact that Rhode Island
courts were available for enforcement of the trust if requested. The dissent pointed
out that, admitting jurisdiction, it was only a matter of grace that the entire corpus
was not taxed.
3 3FLA. STAT. §199.02(2) (Cum. Supp. 1947).
8'Maban v. Lummus, 35 So.2d 725 (Fla. 1948); Owens v. Fosdick, 153 Fla. 17, 13
So.2d 700 (1943).
8"Burrows v. Hagerman, 159 Fa. 826, 33 So.2d 34 (1947).
"8McKay v. Keller, 140 Fla. 346, 191 So. 542 (1939) (license tax on the professions
measured by gross receipts held unconstitutional); Kurz v. Lee, 121 Fla. 360, 163 So.
859 (1935) (statutory scheme impairing income of state college teacher declared un-
constitutional).
8'148 Fla. 66, 3 So.2d 490 (1941).
8153 Fla. 17, 13 So.2d 700 (1943).
6
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tax. The Court declined to follow a Kentucky case3 9 on all fours in which
the state had imposed the tax, because the Kentucky Constitution contain-
ed no similar prohibition against an income tax.
Mahan v. Lummus 40 presented a Florida resident who created a
foreign trust and named herself as beneficiary, reserving the right to the
income for life with remainder over. The trust deed provided that upon
the happening of certain conditions precedent she would be entitled to
amounts of the principal, presumably all if necessary. It was in the
trustee's discretion to determine whether these conditions had occurred be-
fore releasing any of the corpus to the life beneficiary. The Court held
that, since she had only the right to the income and since definite con-
ditions precedent must be met in order to obtain any of the corpus, a tax
on the intangibles would amount to an income tax. This presents the prob-
lem of the location of the current proprietary interest. Here the Court
evidently found that it was with the foreign trustee as legal owner, and
that the settlor-beneficiary 4 l had no proprietary interest in either of those
capacities.
In these cases involving foreign trusts, Florida, in order to tax, must
have jurisdiction of a person who has a present vested beneficial interest in
the trust that amounts to more than the mere right to income. Mahan v.
Lummus 42 reaches the unfortunate result that a resident settlor-beneficiary
of a foreign trust may escape the intangible personal property tax, although
the right to principal, upon certain events, is retained along with the right
to the income.
II. FLORIDA BRANCHES MAINTAINED BY FOREIGN CONCERNS
In the field of intangible tax law the term "business situs" signifies a
factual situation indicating justification for a state's conclusion that it has
jurisdiction to levy an intangible personal property tax.43 In addition to
the intangibles held in the normal course of branch activities in Florida, a
foreign concern may own and keep in another state intangibles regarded as
partaking in its business activities in Florida, on the ground that they form
"gCommonwealth ex rel. Martin v. Sutcllffe, 283 Ky. 274, 140 S. W.2d 1028 (1940).
"Mahan v. Lummus, 35 So.2d 725 (Fla. 1948).
"The tax assessor argued that under a settlor-beneficiary trust the beneficiary
should be considered the owner of the trust corpus as well as the owner of We income.
4235 So.2d 725 (Fla. 1948).
"3Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U. S. 193 (1936); New Orleans v. Stempel, 175
7
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the financial backbone of the concern regardless of the physical location
of the instruments. In the cases involving taxation of intangibles some
are, in the normal instance, admittedly taxable in Florida; but litigation
arises over others claimed to have their actual "business situs" in a foreign
state. The contention is that, since they have no "business situs" in
Florida, it is without jurisdiction to tax. The question of whether a "busi-
ness situs" has been acquired, however, is colored by the practical con-
sideration as to whether the state extends sufficient benefit to the in-
tangibles to tax them.
Non-resident shareholders of national banks located in Florida are
liable for the tax, on the theory that the bank as their agent is present
in Florida.4 4
In Genessee Corp. v. Owens4 5 a Delaware corporation authorized to do
business in Florida held instruments secured by liens on property located
outside the State of Florida. There was no allegation that appellant's
"business situs" or principal place of business was outside Florida, or that
the property was taxed or taxable in any other state; accordingly the
Court felt justified in assuming that the situs of the property for taxation
purposes was in Florida. In Smith v. Lummus 4 6 the problem was whether
accounts receivable, allegedly with their "business situs" at the New York
home office of a brokerage firm, actually had a "business situs" at its
branch office in Florida. The Court said:
4 7
"We are unable to find the testimony in the record to support
this allegation. The customer resides in Florida; the original pay-
ment was made by him in Florida at the branch office; interest and
broker commissions are paid in Florida; Florida law protects the
branch office and business transactions had therein; Florida courts
provide forums for adjudication of differences arising out of the
transaction, and for these several reasons it cannot be said that the
'debit balances' originated in New York, as alleged, to the exclu-
sion of the State of Florida."
The decisions is sound and itndicates that a "business situs" cannot be
U. S. 309 (1899); Powell, The Business Situs of Credits, 28 W. VA. L. Q. 89 (1922).
"Atlantic Nat. Bank v. Simpson, 136 Fla. 809, 188 So. 636 (1938).
'"155 Fla. 601, 20 So.2d 654 (1945).
48153 Fla. 415, 14 So. 2d 897 (1943).
"Id. at 420, 14 So. 2d at 899.
8
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disguised by maintaining separate bank accounts and limiting the branch
to routine matters, with all policy decisions handled at the home office.
The question was, of course, vital for the firm; had the "business situs"
been established in New York there would have been no tax on the in-
tangibles involved.
48
In Gay v. Bessemer Properties, Inc.4 9 the question was whether in-
tangibles, constituting the financial backbone of a Delaware corporation
and located in a Delaware vault, had acquired a "business situs" in
Florida. The complainant, formed by a consolidation of four Delaware
and five Florida corporations, maintained a home office in New York,
where all policy decisions originated, and two offices in Florida, where
Main Account and Payroll Account deposits were established. The Main
Account was subject to New York withdrawals only, and the major invest-
ment of the corporation was admittedly in Florida real estate. On demand
from the comptroller the assessor put these securities on the 1944 tax roll
for back taxes for 1941-1943. In the view of the master, the issue was not
whether these intangibles could be or in fact were taxed elsewhere, 50 but
whether they were taxable in Florida. His report, which was quoted with
approval on appeal, high-lighted the lack of authority of the branch offices
in Florida and the fact that other taxes had been paid on property with a
situs unquestionably in Florida; accordingly he concluded that the in-
tangibles in question were not taxable in Florida.
A comparison of the activities and the amount of benefit extended to
the intangibles involved in the Gay and Smith cases makes reconciliation
difficult. The fact that the intangibles in the former case were in Dela-
ware, with no showing of any definite connection between them and the
actual investment, perhaps justifies the decision. The choice between the
two decisions is basically one of policy. The Smith case51 is preferable
from a revenue-raising standpoint, but the Gay case5 2 is more in line with
the general Florida policy of attracting business to the state. Normally
such a determination should be made by our Legislature, so as to avoid
uncertainty on the part of the judiciary.
'"Roesken, Trends in the Ad Valorem Taxation of Intangibles, 26 TAXES 639 (1948).
"'Gay v. Bessemer Properties, Inc., 159 Fla. 729, 32 So.2d 587 (1947).
"°Roesken, supra note 48. As it happens, neither Delaware nor New York would
tax these intangibles.
1153 Fla. 415, 14 So.2d 897 (1943).
"'15 9 Fla. 729, 32 So. 2d 587 (1947).
9
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IM. NON-RESIDENT CREDITORS SECURED BY FLORIDA REALTY
The secured intangibles in this classification pay once, upon recordation
of the security instrument. They are not subject to an annual levy, what-
ever the life of the intangible involved.5 3 Further, though the statute is
broad,5 4 the Court limits the amount of the indebtedness subject to tax to
the amount of the credit which has a "domiciliary" or "business" situs in
Florida. In State v. Gay5 5 a new foreign corporation resulting from a re-
organization proceeding took over the property of the old corporation and
in exchange gave creditors of the latter bonds secured by mortgages on
the new corporation's property in six states, Florida included. The State
argued that the tax should be levied on the proportionate share of the bonds
secured by Florida realty, regardless of the domicile of the owners or of
any possible foreign business situs of the bonds, or alternatively, that the
statute should be construed as imposing an excise tax for the privilege of
recording the mortgage. The Court pointed out that the statute imposed a
property rather than an excise tax and then continued: 5 6
"An essential and indispensable feature of the power of taxation
is that either the owner of personal property be a resident, or that
the property be situated within the district attempting to exercise
the power to tax..... The fact that the indebtedness may be secured
by a mortgage on real property situated in a State other than the
domicile or business situs of the owner of the debt will not give the
indebtedness a tax situs in the state where the real property is
located."
Although painful from a revenue-producing standpoint the decision is
not without justification, since the owners of 99 per cent of the indebted-
ness were residents of other states, the debtor corporation was not domi-
ciled in Florida, and but a single transaction was involved. One transac-
"FLA. STAT. §199.11(3) (Cum. Supp. 1947): "The tax imposed by this subsection
shall be the only intangible tax levied on such notes, bonds and other obligations under
this chapter."
"4FLA. STAT. §199.11(3) (Cum. Supp. 1947): .... taxable value shall be the prin-
cipal amount of the indebtedness... :1
"'State ex rd. Seaboard A. L. Ry. v. Gay, 35 So.2d 403 (Fla. 1948).
"Id. at 410.
10
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tion does not create a "business situs. ' ' 5 7 The fact that resort to Florida
courts would be necessary in order to enforce the debt in event of default
would justify an opposite holding5 8 if the statute5 9 had been carefully
drafted so as to express a distinct meaning. On the one hand, it shows
an intention not to reach beyond the Florida realty mortgaged, thus in-
dicating by implication that it should reach this far in any event, and that
the mortgaged realty in Florida is the significant factor. On the other
hand, the statute begins by designating, as the incidence of the tax, the
obligation itself rather than the mortgage securing it. This factor was
obviously the one that most impressed the Court. The corporation paid the
tax on the amount of debt owned by Florida residents, and they will not
have to report these bonds again, regardless of the life of the bonds.
60
IV. CONCLUSION
There is no solid ground upon which to criticize the Court's applica-
tion of the intangible personal property tax law. It has carried into each
case the Florida policy on taxation and has made a sincere effort to arrive
at fair and equitable results. Nevertheless, as the cost of playing tax-
haven becomes more apparent to the general citizenry, the policy may be
expected to change.
Dropping the intangible personal property tax and effecting the con-
stitutional repeal 6 ' necessary to permit the levy of an income tax would
eliminate the major problems encountered in the trust cases, since the test
would then be: Does Florida have jurisdiction of the individual receiving
the income from the trust?8 2 A net income tax substituted for the in-
tangible personal property tax would also remove the problem in the
"business situs" cases; in such event the only question would be: Was the
money earned for a foreign holder via Florida transactions?6 3 Substitu-
"1New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309 (1899).
"8Greenough v. Tax Assessors of Newport, 331 U. S. 486 (1947).
59FIA. STAT. §199.02(3) (Cum. Supp. 1947), quoted in note 14 supra; cf. State
ex rel. Tampa Electric Co. v. Gay, 40 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1949), in which the court again
had difficulty with the ambiguous statute.
OOFLA. STAT. §199.11(3) (Cum. Supp. 1947), quoted in note 53 supra.
"1The constitutional prohibition against an income tax found in FLA. CONST. Art.
IX, §11, would have to be removed.
"Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U. S. 19 (1938) (even though the foreign
trustee may pay a tax on the same income at his domicile).
"aUnderwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113 (1920) (approving
plan of apportionment to determine amount of income derived from activities in the
11
Caroll: Intangible Personal Property Tax: Limited Revenue Producing Abili
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1949
